Freud's Theory of Affect: Questions for Neuroscience

Our focus on Freud's classical theory of affect for this preliminary interchange reflects our desire to clarify, in the first instance, the anatomical and physiological correlates of the basic ideas and most general concepts of psychoanalysis. We shall make no attempt here to address subsequent developments and current theoretical controversies in the psychoanalytic understanding of affect.

Freud's affect theory is poorly understood and frequently misrepresented. This is attributable largely to the fact that he never published a definitive, comprehensive statement of this theory. It evolved in piecemeal fashion, over a long period of time (more than 40 years), and his various formulations, which focused now on one aspect of the problem and now on another, were not always consistent. The following schematic summary aims only to provide a didactic outline of the theory as a whole. Therefore our account focuses on Freud's theoretical conclusions, not the clinical observations upon which they were based.

According to Freud, the mental apparatus as a whole serves the biological purpose of meeting the imperative internal needs of the subject in a changing (and largely indifferent) external environment. These needs are expressed through “drives”: quantitative demands on the mental apparatus to perform work (i.e., to bring about the specific changes that are necessary to relieve current internal needs). The general functioning of the apparatus is governed by a regulatory mechanism known as the “pleasure principle.” With this principle, value is assigned to mental performances according to a formula whereby the successful meeting of inner needs in the external world (a quantitative reduction in drive pressure) is felt qualitatively as pleasure. Unsuccessful performances or deteriorating external circumstances (a quantitative increase in drive tension) is felt qualitatively as unpleasure. This is the origin and purpose (the evolutionary “why?”)