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The target article—a timely retrospection by one of the most creative exponents of the microgenetic theory—is refreshing for its personal honesty and authenticity. Scholars in the field of cognitive and neuropsychology can profit a lot from this brief historiography of the microgenetic theory. It also gives a peep into the evolution of ideas of mind in the mind of the theorist. The microgenetic theory as articulated in the literature is an account of the mental processes from their primeval origins to the potential realization in consciousness as lived experience. Later, the theory evolved (Brown, 1991, 1996, 2000) to capture the realization of mind beyond the limits of the intrapersonal, and contentious issues such as value, morality, and good life were also brought within the ambit of the original thesis. Even in Mind, Brain and Consciousness (MBC) (Brown, 1977) one can glimpse the seeds of this kind of thinking. While the theory attracted a wider scrutiny at that time, it was out of sync with those times. Cognitive psychology then was burdened with its own baggage of metaphors mostly borrowed from information-processing theories. The strong Al version was all too good for simulation studies and model builders. A process concept of mind in evolution in real time appeared alien to most working with flow charts and box diagrams. The latter was akin to an attempt to characterize the mind as a static entity, the way engineering drawings would capture the internal workings of a motor. An argument for the genetic basis of language led to the devaluation of the concepts of development and growth. Chomsky (1979) went to the extent of arguing that “… In any event, the crucial point in the present connection is that cognitive structures and physical organs seem to be comparable, as far as the possibility of ‘biological explanation’ is concerned” (p. 36).
To this Changeux (1979) replied: “The metaphor brain-liver may be useful for an audience of linguists, but it is misleadin