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Shevrin brings to bear cognitive and neuroscience research to develop a psychoanalytic theory of memory. Armed with this research, he argues that it is possible to objectively distinguish true from false memories. Indeed this purported ability is one of the key foundations of his overall theory. According to Shevrin, it should be possible to locate the original (true) memory of a given experience through a close examination of the patient's transference. Shevrin bases this conclusion, in large part, on behavioral work (exemplified by studies such as Schooler, Gerhard and Loftus, 1986) and neurophysiological work (for example, by Fabiani, Stadler and Wessels, 2000).
Consider first the actual behavioral data upon which Shevrin relies for his faith in the ability to distinguish true and false memories. To appreciate our argument that his faith is misplaced, a few methodological details are important to recount. In one study, Schooler et al. (1986) showed a simulated accident in which a red Datsun passed an intersection with a yield sign (for some subjects). For other subjects, there was no sign, but a yield sign was suggested to have occurred. Later, when subjects were tested for their memory of the accident details, 76% of the “real yield” subjects, and 25% of the “suggested yield” subjects claimed to have seen the sign, and wrote out a description of what they saw. A comparison of the “real” and “suggested” reports revealed some statistical differences. The “real” subjects expressed more confidence that they had seen the sign (2.84 versus 2.57 on a 3-point scale). Moreover, the descriptions of the “real” subjects differed on a variety of dimensions. For example, 41% of the “real” descriptions contained at least one sensory attribute (e.g., size, color of the sign),