Commentary on “On the Nature of Repressed Contents”: Are Unconscious Mental States Really Neurophysiological Dispositions? Why Searle's Model of the Unconscious Won't Do

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science provide important concepts and tools for making sense of the architecture of mind. One of the most prominent contributors to the debates in this arena is the philosopher John Searle. Vesa Talvitie and Juhani Ihanus have taken the very useful step of exploring how Searle's approach might clarify our conception of the unconscious. Although I do not share their evaluation of Searle, I applaud their effort.

I shall first explore the historical background of the debate that Searle has revived (a position very much like the one that he espouses was widely held in the nineteenth century) and then go on to present Searle's theory and some objections to it, culminating in an argument against the dispositionalist position derived from the work of Sigmund Freud. Finally, I shall comment on some reservations expressed by Talvitie and Ihanus about my interpretation of the strength of this argument.

In order to come to grips with the debate about the nature of unconscious mental states, one must begin in the seventeenth century, when René Descartes propounded his highly influential model of the mind. The Cartesian platform was built from three planks, each resting upon the previous one, namely:

1. Minds and bodies are different kinds of thing, which interact with one another. Bodies are material things, operating on mechanical principles, whereas minds are nonmaterial things.

2. Minds are entirely conscious. They can neither be mistaken about nor ignorant of their own contents.

3. Introspection provides a true account of mental contents.

Over the centuries, aspects of the model were modified (most notable, the notoriously problematic claim that body and mind interact), but the fundamental notion that mind is a nonphysical and entirely conscious entity remained the dominant psychological perspective until at least the early decades of the twentieth centur