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In this article, the thesis that the id is conscious [Solms, (2013a) The conscious id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1), 5–19] is scrutinized by carving out a crucial implicit assumption on which the argument relies. The validity of this assumption is then assessed in two ways: first by an analysis of Freud’s description of the relation between the mental apparatus and the brain, second by analyzing the neuropsychoanalytical implications of the Mealy machine [Mealy, 1955. A method for synthesizing sequential circuits. Bell Labs Technical Journal, 34(5), 1045–1079] – a mathematical model that is used to describe the relation between the software and hardware of computers. The result of my assessment is that Solms’s implicit assumption faces serious objections and therefore the conclusion that the id is conscious cannot be upheld. In the remaining article I develop, based on the neuroscientific findings on which Solms developed his thesis [Solms & Panksepp, 2012. The “id” knows more than the “ego” admits: Neuropsychoanalytic and primal consciousness perspectives on the interface between affective and cognitive neuroscience. Brain Sciences, 2(2), 147–175], a concurrent adaptation of the structural model. This is achieved by an analysis of Freud's development of his metapsychological theory from 1899 to 1923, with a strong focus on the conceptualization of consciousness that underwent, as I shall work out, a major change. The result is a new metapsychological model that, so I claim, gets rid of a crucial weak spot of the structural model [Freud, 1923. The ego and the id. Standard Edition, 19, 12–59] and allows the integration of different neuropsychological theories.