Basic Mental Concepts: Their Clinical and Theoretical Value

The greatest difficulty in making plausible reconstructions of early development lies in the fact that while we cannot do without the concept of organized structure, the earlier we seek to

apply this concept the more violence it does to our reconstructions. No doubt it is possible to underestimate as well as to overestimate the complexity of organization of early psychic life. But in my opinion the greater scientific danger lies in overestimation. It is for this reason that I suggest applying the term embryonic to those earlier dynamic stages of development that cover the first two years of life. If by adopting this usage we occasionally do less than justice to the precocity of the exceptional infant, at any rate we avoid the danger of accepting fantastic reconstructions that bring metapsychology into merited disrepute. At least we must treat with the utmost reserve reconstructions that postulate a functional identity between the first and the third year. Fortunately we can avoid this pitfall if we submit all reconstructions to the most meticulous scrutiny, using for this purpose the basic mental concepts left us as a scientific heritage by the founder of psychoanalysis.