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Brickner and Barnum, in an attempt to devise a system of nomenclature which would bring the disorders of thought and intellect into closer consonance with the rest of neurological functioning, postulate the existence of a neurointellectual system comparable to the neuromotor and neurosensory systems. The latter two merely have more specific end organs than the former so that an idea, for example, differs from a muscular movement in that it is the product of neural activity without a recognizable end organ of special structure. The evidences for the existence of this neurointellectual system are reviewed. These include the phenomena of forced thoughts as they occur in epilepsy (held by Penfield to involve the frontal or temporal lobes), with electrical stimulation of the brain and with postencephalitic oculogyric crises. Other evidence is the isolated loss of specific thoughts in hypnosis, possibly by deactivation of specific cortical areas.
This neurointellectual system is considered to be an extension of the neurosensory system, while thought is another form or modality of sensation. Thought and consciousness are not identical, but rather thoughts, like vision, may reach consciousness and one then becomes aware of them. Thought is afferent to consciousness. In accord with this concept, various types of intellectual defect can then be classified in consonance with the rest of neurological nomenclature and with Nielsen's basic terminology.