Journal of Personality. XX, 1951.: The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis. David Rapaport. Pp. 56-81.

The construction of an explicit model of a scientific theory allows the inquiring scientist to survey the breadth and depth of the theory, to discover gaps in the theory that can be filled in, and to note the overlap with other theories. A theoretical model also provides a device for generating new and significant questions for investigation.

The theoretical model of psychoanalysis is essentially intended to account for psychological processes of both the developing organism (the primary model) and the mature organism (the secondary model). The psychoanalytic model considers as aspects of a unitary process all the phenomena characterized in traditional psychology under the headings of conation, cognition, and affection. The primary and secondary models of conation, cognition, and affection are derived by Rapaport from the basic model: need®need-satisfying object and/or delay®need gratification and/or affect discharge and/or ideation. It is not necessary that this model be rooted in invariable observational sequences. Its hypothetical character stimulates observation and fruitful experimentation so long as the model systematically coordinates the constructs to be used and holds out the hope that meaningful deductions can be made from it.

The primitive model of conation is: restlessness®appearance of breast and sucking®subsidence of restlessness. Restlessness is conceptualized as tension having its source in a drive (motivation); breast and sucking are conceptualized as devices for lowering tension and represent the object and the discharge of the drive. The subsiding of restlessness is conceptualized as reduction of tension, or gratification. The pleasure principle is the conceptual representation of the directional tendency of this motivation.

From this basic model one can deduce the primary model of cognition: drive®absence of object and/or delay®hallucinatory image of the memory of