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The author discusses four chief objections to the method and content of psychoanalysis. 1. Freud's lack of sophistication concerning the philosophy of science and his tendency to reify his concepts. 2. It is unscientific to assume the existence
of internal conditions—the unconscious, instincts, reaction-formation, and 'central' processes—on the basis of such evidence as subjective fantasies. 3. Psychoanalysis is introspectionistic and its theories too far removed from observable data. 4. Psychoanalysis tends to weaken ethical principles and to foster immorality while minimizing the role of reason.
In Frenkel-Brunswik's critique, Freud and psychoanalysis not only emerge as scientifically respectable but are—surprisingly—vindicated by the views prevailing among the philosophers of science. It is clear that Freud generally proceeded in a now approved 'operational' way long before operationalism was conceptualized. Frenkel-Brunswik writes, 'Actually Freud, in contrast to some of his followers, was keenly aware of logical and epistemological problems… Freud's concept of instinct is a truly explanatory, inferential construct imbued with some degree of independence. He avoided unnecessary duplication by fully considering the functional ambiguities inherent in the relationships between drives and behavior rather than by directly projecting behavioral trends back into the subjects.
'One of the most bewildering aspects of psychoanalytic theory is the turning away from the obvious face-value picture of personality as it derives from introspection or from the direct, "phenotypical" observation of external behavior segments. An example is the reinterpretation of overt friendliness as a sign of underlying hostility, or of extreme tidiness as a sign of preoccupation with dirt. The discrepancy disappears with the specification of a set of fixed or variable operational conditions that determine when overt behavior is to be interpreted as "genuine" and when as manifesting s