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Some of the principal concepts of Freud's theory of instinct are examined and compared with their homologues in the instincts of lower animals. A phylogenetic anticipation of dynamic system perhaps exists in the displacement activity of animals, whereby an instinctual activity set in motion and then blocked transfers its impetus to a different, inappropriate activity. The instinctual act and the wish which represents it psychically can be dissected into the following components: subject, object, contact apparatus, role, and technique. Role (active, passive, or reflexive) and technique are both included in Freud's term 'aim'. Technique is the actual performance, and according to the current ethological image it is proposed to distinguish between appetitive (object-finding) and consummatory (definitive, concluding) acts. A category of approach or preparatory acts is also proposed. Contact apparatus is the pair of body structures to be apposed in the performance of the act. Freud refers to the subject's apparatus as the 'source', while the object's apparatus is comprehended within the 'aim'. In animal instincts there is a fixed and limited set of instinctual needs, whereas in man, by virtue of plasticity, a much larger number of combinations is possible, of which some few are favored by each individual as a result of endowment or infantile experience. Hence man requires an elaborate testing system to eliminate new combinations which are inappropriate or dangerous, whereas animals do not. Because of this tremendous variability in form, and because of the consistency of activation, human instinctual behavior is not limited to rigid patterns evoked intermittently by internal needs or to responses to external demands but rather maintains a constant pressure leading to numberless varieties of constructive work and libidinal coöperation.
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