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This essay, begun in collaboration with David Rapaport, is similar to their earlier efforts to clarify psychoanalytic theory. It does not attempt to validate psychoanalytic concepts nor does it offer new data for consideration.
Gill seeks theoretically to establish that a separate topographical point of view is no longer necessary. The argument is first, that Freud abandoned topographical systems in favor of structural systems; second, that the relationship of mental contents to consciousness, which is the clinical base for maintaining the topographic point of view, is encompassed by the structural, dynamic, economic, genetic, and adaptive points of view. The documentation is relegated to footnotes to permit the main thread of the very complex argument to be more easily followed. Despite this assistance, the very fact that the argument is exclusively theoretical poses the greatest difficulty for the reader. This essay cannot be read; it must be carefully studied with a prerequisite knowledge of psychoanalytic theory.
A well-organized historical outline of the development of the topographical point of view reveals the limitations which led to the formulation of the structural point of view. This resumé, with Gill's explanatory and interpretative comments, merits the attention and critical examination of all psychoanalysts.
It is possible that some readers will agree with Gill's observation 'that the matter after all is one of definition', but will disagree with his redefinitions and with his conclusions. These will represent a minority since the thesis expressed here accords with other recent