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Judicial interpretation of the freedom of speech which is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution has traditionally been based on the model of man as a rational being whose conduct is controlled by reasoned thought and decision and whose interaction in the process of attitude and opinion formation is characterized by the 'market place of ideas' in which the process of discussion or the competition of ideas tends to the result that the true ideas are 'bought' and the false ones discarded.
The model of man and his thought which arises out of psychoanalytic theory and experience includes the new dimension of primary process functioning and views the whole of mental functioning as a process interpenetrated by both primary and secondary process modes of functioning. Man's rationality is not longer his dominant and defining characteristic; rather, it has come to be seen as one among several modes of mental functioning, none of which occurs without the interpenetration to some degree of the other modes. Along with primary process mental functioning comes interpersonal interaction, the influence of which is mainly