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DISCUSSION: Dr. Leo A. Spiegel observed that all empirical sciences are compelled to construct assumptions and hypotheses in order to make meaning and sense of their observations, whether or not such assumptions and hypotheses agree with other ideas prevailing at the time. Psychoanalysis as an empirical science may do the same, whether its assumptions do or do not agree with those of an adjacent science such as neurology. Dr. Spiegel questioned Dr. Rubinstein's solution of the problem of language incoherence in psychoanalysis through his assumption of two worlds. Whenever language incoherence appears, according to Dr. Spiegel, it indicates a defect in the relevant psychoanalytic constructs; alteration of such constructs is then called for. Dr. Rubinstein's two-worlds approach appears to leave them untouched. What is one to do with the fact that the everyday world goes beyond immediate experience and is permeated with inference just as the scientific world is? What criterion is there to differentiate the two worlds? Perhaps the two-worlds idea is another way of talking about the perennial mind-body problem. As for the concept of self, Dr. Spiegel thought that we must employ this concept in order to comprehend certain recurring processes and that it does not serve comprehension merely to equate self and person. Dr. Hartvig Dahl agreed with Dr. Rubinstein's view of a "human being" as a two-valued variable: person and organism. Persons are understood by assigning meaning to their