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In philosophical parlance a representation is a conscious phenomenon, the fact of representing an object to oneself. However, when Freud speaks of unconscious representation, he refers to the mnemic trace of the representation, which, once recathected by a quantum of affect, re-evokes the representation to consciousness. How are we to understand memory traces? Habitually, primary process supports a very partial retention of energy in the memory trace. In the Project for a Scientific Psychology, a memory trace is not a miniaturization of the object, but is described rather as a particular arrangement of facilitation ensuring that, once recathected, this pathway will be utilized rather than another.
Can one speak of a mnemic trace of affect? In the Project Freud speaks of a motor image of discharge, while in 1900 in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud speaks of the lack of sensorial qualities to the mnemic traces. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety of 1926 Freud speaks of affects being incorporated into psychic life through sediments of very archaic traumatic events. Does representation come to be differentiated beginning with this archaic phenomenon apparently older than affect? Or do representations and affect come from the same source? The author considers three hypotheses with respect to thing-presentations.
1The psychical representative of instinct, emerging from its biological roots and