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our own. Cognitive scientists and psychoanalysts make some of the same assumptions. Most in both groups assume representational phenomena in a mental realm (i.e., mind). Mind is then further assumed to be related in significant (though not necessarily agreed upon) ways to the brain. Regarding the mind, the assumptions of both groups include conscious and nonconscious operations, functions, and "structures," along with the representations or contents. Not surprisingly, then, there is an overlap of interest in many areas: consciousness (and unconsciousness), awareness, perception, dreaming, mental images, fantasy, amnesia, repression, planful action and parapraxis, attention, affect, conflicted motivation, and a variety of psychological symptoms.
However, cognitive scientists study these familiar psychological phenomena with a variety of experimental methods, all quite different from the psychoanalytic method. The differences are in: 1) the data derived, the hypotheses tested, and the conclusions drawn; and 2) the ultimate goals of the method—cognitive science goals are not clinical goals. But just as other clinical (medical) sciences are closely influenced by developments in their cognate basic sciences, psychoanalysts should be interested in cognitive science. At the very least, a new view of phenomena familiar to analysts will be stimulating. At best, cognitive science can provide independent evidence, convergent or disconfirming, for some of our general theoretical hypotheses, which may in turn even suggest directions for change in psychoanalytic technique.
our own. Cognitive scientists and psychoanalysts make some of the same assumptions. Most in both groups assume representational phenomena in a mental realm (i.e., mind). Mind is then further assumed to be related in significant (though not necessarily agreed upon) ways to the brain. Regarding the mind, the assumptions of both groups include conscious and nonconscious operations, functions, and "