Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought. XV, 1992.: The Nonexperiential Unconscious. Eric Gillett. Pp. 89-96.

This paper is one in a series written by the author to argue for a “broad” concept of the unconscious. Gillett discusses Freud's concept of the “descriptive unconscious” as limited to mental contents that may be preconscious or dynamically unconscious; he calls this the “narrow” concept, because under the right conditions, all

mental contents can become conscious. Gillett's thesis is that the “broad” concept, which is divided into an experiential and nonexperiential unconscious, is necessary in order to avoid the confusion that now exists in psychoanalytic literature. In addition, broadening the concept would bring the psychoanalytic view of the unconscious more into accord with that of cognitive psychology. The author's definition of the nonexperiential is “everything mental that is incapable of becoming conscious under any conditions.” He includes in this the operation of defense mechanisms and the activation of these mechanisms. In psychoanalytic literature, he finds a confusion between a defense mechanism and defense contents, which are mental contents serving a defense function, and are capable of being made conscious.