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Fast traces the development of object relations theory with its concept of the self, and the structural model with its concept of the ego. She shows how the “pervasive interpenetration of concepts from the two domains” calls for a more comprehensive framework to accommodate both. Several authors, most notably Kernberg and Jacobson, have attempted to integrate the two models. Greenberg and Mitchell feel the two models are fundamentally incompatible. As Hartmann delineated the concepts, the self is to be understood in relation to objects, the ego in relation to the id and superego. In an attempt at integration he suggested that the self be seen as a representation in the ego. Subsequently, self and objects are seen as nondynamic representations; the id, ego, and superego as dynamic systems. Fast then reframes the issue as being the relationship between the representational or imagistic aspects of the mind and the dynamic ones. Defining what she would consider to be a satisfactory model of the relationship of self and ego, she approaches it using an “event theory,” “an attempt to integrate Piaget's and psychoanalytic theories.” The author, who has written a book on this theory, defines it: “Events are bodily interactions between self and non-self, registered in discrete dynamic schemes representing