A Note on the use of the Concept of the Soul in Psychoanalytic Discourse

I have become increasingly aware in the course of reading current psychoanalytic literature that the concept of the soul frequently finds its way into analytic discourse. I find this trend puzzling and discomforting, since it seems to override some essential distinctions and leaves what seems to me a misleading impression that the term soul has some valid analytic meaning. More generally, the term soul occasionally enters psychological, psychoanalytic, and even other scientific discourse; historically, it seems to have found its way into the analytic lexicon from the time of Freud on (Bettelheim 1983; Jung 1933; Lear 1990, 1998; Rank 1930; Shengold 1989; Spezzano and Gargiulo 1997).

Nonetheless, I maintain that soul is a commonsense concept familiar in the well-worn phrase body and soul;1 it also serves as a technical term in philosophical, religious, and theological contexts. As such it has a long history. I find it important that the meaning and implications of the term soul be specified, in the context of seeking some clarity in understanding. Zusman (2003), for example,