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In this article, the authors first describe two different kinds of constructivism in present-day psychoanalytic theory: a “radical” constructivism in which reality is unknowable, and an “ordinary” constructivism in which reality is knowable, but only through our subjectivity. It is then argued that these two types of constructivism “do not differ in substance” (p. 5) because in each the constructions of humans determine reality, and in each the Aristotelian concept of truth as a correspondence between knowledge and external reality is rejected.
The authors go on to argue that constructivism is a rebirth of early 18th -century subjective idealism, and is thus subject to the same logical inconsistencies. These include the fact that the postulate “reality is principally unknowable” (p. 8) cannot be substantiated because “no decision can be made on whether such a reality exists at all” (p. 8)—nor, if it does, on whether it is knowable or not, if all you have to go on are constructions. Another problem is that “in order to be able to construct themselves as constructivists, subjects of cognition have to be constructivists beforehand” (p. 9). “In other words, constructivism has to be existent before it exists” (p. 9). And, to provide one more example, the authors show that the constructivist view of “truth”—and especially historical truth—leads to its losing any “substantial meaning” (p. 10) if it is based solely on consensus or “congruency of psychic contents” (p. 10).