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The history of psychoanalysis could be usefully read as a history of the progressive differentiation of basic human motives. Certainly, the earlier histories of psychoanalytic schisms—of which Freud versus Jung is only the first example—are rapidly illumined by recognition of the central roles of debates over the relative primacy of various motives.
Most of the debates about the nature of the basic motivations within psychoanalytic theory assumed, at least within most of American psychoanalysis after the introduction of the structural theory, an ad hominem argument for the rejection of any comprehensive theory of motivation other than dual drive. It was possible, perhaps, to dispense with arguments for expanding the conceptual basis of primary motivations by rejecting the possibility of additional motives as being by definition unpsychoanalytic.
Widespread dissatisfaction with dual drive motivational theory is only a relatively recent development, especially within the mainstream of American psychoanalytic thought represented by the American Psychoanalytic Association and its institutes. In our current season of what I believe is a very productive discontent, it has finally become possible to give new consideration to the expansion of the motivational repertoire of psychoanalytic metathe-ory, as do Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage in Self and Motivational Systems.
This monograph, which draws heavily on its first author's earlier works Psychoanalysis and Infant Research (1983) and Psychoanalysis and Motivation (1989), presumes as a basis a fivefold division of motives, “each…built around a fundamental need” (p. 1). The five primary human motivational systems these authors designate are