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As Indicated in the Title, I will propose in this paper a theoretical model of mental functioning or, rather, of some of the aspects of this functioning that at least in part seem readily describable in terms of classificatory processes. I do not aim for completeness. In a sense what I am presenting is essentially an illustration of a point of view, a way of looking at things that I believe is promising.
To provide a proper context I must make a number of general remarks before presenting the model. These will have to be rather lengthy, or else misunderstandings may easily arise. The issues are complex and quite basic. I will thus discuss, in this order, a particular aspect of theoretical psychological models, the distinction between causal explanation and explanation in terms of meaning and, briefly, the identity theory of the mind-brain relationship.
In approaching the question of theoretical psychological models, it is important to bear in mind that a theoretical psychological model is a scientific, not a humanistic, model, i.e., its reference is not to persons but to the human organisms as which these persons appear when looked at from the point of view of natural science.