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In Part I, I suggested that as a theory, psychoanalysis cuts through the purported distinction between hermeneutical and natural sciences and is a biological view, distinguished from others in giving full attention to the fact that its subject is an organism that can speak and has a mind. In this emphasis psychoanalysis necessarily has links to philosophy. I defended Freud's structural theory as a view of the mind at once biological, personal, and interpersonal, and philosophically astute.
I distinguished two different senses of self, one nested inside the other, which are presumed by any act of fully conscious I-thinking or I-saying; and said that this act itself, with all it implies, generates a third sense of self.
Self in sense 1 was defined as a structure of consciousness in a weak sense of consciousness, including early forms of sentience and inarticulable awareness. Considered genetically, it is the earliest self there is. But I mean it to be the name of that structure of consciousness in the most inclusive sense which at any point in an organism's existence includes all those inter-related