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In an earlier paper (1984), I elaborated the idea that a prerequisite for an understanding of the psychoanalytic insight phenomenon is its conception as a cognitive act, and consequently its embeddedness in an appropriate theory of cognition. A schema was presented for classifying various kinds of insight (Figure 1) based on Nilsson's genetic/hierarchical theory of cognition (1983), which unifies the central ideas of Piaget and Freud. The basic idea of the suggested classification schema is that insight can be hierarchically (i.e., structurally) identified in relation to sensorimotor, perceptual, or conceptual instrumental levels of cognitive activity. By “insight,” then, is understood the cognitive activity (presentation) vis-à-vis internal need-stimuli, as contrasted with “outsight,” where the external object-stimuli are recognized and accounted for. From the genetic point of view, the classificatory model implies that the hierarchy of instrumental levels can be related to ontogenetic development in the child. This would mean that the child's capacity for insight (as well as outsight) is developmentally determined. Finally,