In this paper we attempt two things. The first is to make explicit Freud's views on psychological explanation. In undertaking this partly textual task: (1) We look at what Freud thought is the kind of knowledge we may gain of mental (including unconscious) processes. Is this knowledge like that gained in other sciences? Is it sure? Is it inferential? (2) We look at the way Freud considered his theoretical concepts are set up. (3) We also look at what Freud considered to be the “nature” of the mental concepts he uses to explain and understand action. Are they mental concepts of material processes? Are these causally related to behavior? This latter constitutes a discussion of Freud's views on that perennial problem of psychology, the relationship between mind and brain.

The second thing that we try to do is show that Freud's views on these matters are far from being the naive and antiquated ones that they are often held to be. Indeed, they amount