Self-Deception, Defense, and Narration

Freudian analysts have not established self-deception under that description as a problem with which they should be concerned. They do not focus on self-deception in their formal propositions, and they do not mention it with any frequency in their informal discussions of theoretical and clinical matters. However, some casual versions of self-deception do crop up within the clinical dialogue, for example, when the analysand says to the analyst, “My mind played tricks on me” or when the analyst comments “You are kidding yourself.”

Traditionally, analysts have taken up the phenomena presented in these self-deception locutions under the description defense. The idea of defense, however, is not simple and straightforward. It has been embedded in the complex, technical vocabulary that Freud introduced and dubbed metapsychology. Consequently, before taking up self-deception as narration, it will be necessary to review both the place of defense in traditional analytic discourse and the assumptions that secure it in this place. This review requires comparative discussion of defense in the mechanistic terms of Freud's metapsychology and