Freud and Consciousness: VI. A Present-Day Perspective

Searle has recently proposed, in effect, an alternative conception of the psychical apparatus, though one with certain similarities to Freud's conception. According to Searle, only conscious psychical processes possess intrinsic intentionality (mental content). All non-conscious processes are supposed to be purely physiological, though some of them have close causal relations with conscious psychical processes, relations that are similar to those postulated by Freud. Freud considered the kind of view expressed by Searle to be a major obstacle to wide acceptance of his psychoanalytic account of the psychical apparatus. Interestingly, such a dissenting view has again emerged (despite the wide commitment of present-day cognitive science to nonconscious intentionality), it is being argued with vigor by a leading philosopher of language and mind, and it has already received considerable attention. On what grounds has Searle claimed, contrary to Freud, that we should identify the intrinsically psychical entirely with the conscious? The present article examines Searle's argumentation and finds it inadequate to his ambitious goals, which include a major reorientation of psychology, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and psychoanalytic theory and research.