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Having come this far in my effort to improve our understanding of Freud and consciousness, I am concerned that my series of articles may require, at this point, a change in the direction of its development in order to ensure the inclusion of all dimensions of what Freud proposed about consciousness. Fortunately, I have been anticipated in my effort to spell out Freud's theory of consciousness, most especially by David Rapaport and Merton M. Gill. Therefore, I turn my attention next to certain crucial dimensions of how Rapaport and Gill have understood Freud on consciousness. These authors held, as I have not, that the following two theses are of central importance to Freud's conception. (1) Consciousness qua subsystem of the psychical apparatus is itself an apparatus analogous to a sense organ. (2) The sense organ consciousness operates by the economics of the distribution of attention cathexes. Consequently, Rapaport and Gill's interpretation of Freud differs substantially from the one I have been presenting in this series of articles. I show in the present installment that my interpretation stands up very well as against the alternative.