What makes a mental state conscious? Rosenthal's answer differs from Freud's, which I have been explicating in the present series of articles. Freud holds that consciousness is an intrinsic property of certain mental states and cannot literally be acquired by preconscious or unconscious mental states. Rosenthal argues that any mental state is rendered conscious, thereby and therein, by an assertoric thought which affirms the occurrence of the particular mental state and takes place at roughly the same time as the latter, provided no additional thought occurs to the effect that the accompanying assertoric thought is a product of inference. It follows that any one of Freud's dynamically unconscious mental states would be rendered conscious if the person reliably had accompanying, apparently noninferential thoughts affirming its occurrence. I contrast the two accounts with reference to Freud's three components of intrinsic consciousness, and I argue contra Rosenthal's account.