This paper argues for the concept of self-as-structural. The relation between the self and the tripartite structural model is discussed in terms of conceiving id, ego, and superego as substructural components of the supraordinate self. Insofar as the entities of the structural hypothesis are theoretical constructs, they do not possess a principle of agency proper to themselves, but are attributed agency which belongs properly to the self. The ego, for example, is the self acting in its ego modality of exercising ego-functions; the superego is the self acting in its superego modality of exercising superego functions. Aspects of the diversification of actions of the self in contexts of both conflictual and integrated action are discussed. The view of the self-as-structural stands in opposition to any concept of self as representation, fantasy, or schema in that these are merely cognitive structures devoid of agency. The role of internalizations in forming or modifying the self-system is discussed and the rationale for secondarily attributing their effects to respective substructural entities is explored.