Freud and Consciousness: XI. A Different Interpretation Considered

One major purpose of this series of articles is to convince readers that Freud does indeed qualify as “a sophisticated and relevant theorist of consciousness,” as Dr. Paul Redding calls him in his essay “Freud's Theory of Consciousness” (2000). My effort continues here to provide as accurate a picture as I am able of Freud's conception of consciousness, with special reference to an interpretation of this conception other than the one I have been developing in the present series, namely, that which Redding sets forth in his essay. Wherever it seems necessary, I try to improve on what I have written previously concerning Freud's theory, and I take the opportunity to reinforce my case for construing Freud as I have. Among other things, I relate to my analyses a distinction that Redding puts to central use between two kinds of consciousness. Redding suggests that Freud relied to good effect on this distinction in his account of the unconscious psychical processes. The distinction lies between two properties that belong to individual psychical processes: A psychical process is “phenomenally conscious” if there is something it is like to undergo it, and “access conscious” if it is poised for use as a premise in reasoning and the rational control of action and

speech. Freud's dynamically unconscious psychical processes are not “poised”; repression prevents them from being accessed. But, according to Redding's understanding of Freud's theory, they nevertheless instantiate phenomenal consciousness.