Theoretical Constructs and the Self-as-Agent

In a series of papers (2000a, b, c) William Meissner proposes a revision of Freud's structural theory in which the self-as-agent plays the central role. His concept of self-as-agent is based on a notion of psychic structures conceptualized as theoretical constructs inferred from clinical observations. In previous papers I have argued that a widespread misunderstanding of the nature of theoretical constructs has been a source of confusion over the concept of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. In the present paper I will argue that the same misunderstanding undermines Meissner's theory of the self-as-agent. He claims that psychic structures do not exist in space-time and are radically different from physical structures. Although he is correct in asserting that theoretical constructs are inferred from empirical observations, he fails to examine the nature of such inferences, which are incompatible with his view of psychic structure. An analysis of the reasoning underlying the inferring of theoretical constructs supports the conclusion that theoretical constructs in psychology refer to brain states described at the functional level, a conclusion which meshes well with the protoneurophysiological model advocated by Rubinstein (1967) and Holt (1989).