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I consider here Professor David Livingstone Smith's explication, in a recent book and articles, of Freud's theory of consciousness. As before, I proceed by seeking to provide as accurate a picture as I can of Freud's conception. Wherever it seems necessary, I attempt to improve on what I have written previously, and I take opportunity the to reinforce my case for construing Freud as I have. Much agreement is to be expected between Smith's and my understanding of Freud's account, because Smith has studied six articles of the present series and expressed his indebtedness to them. In contrast to the author discussed in article XI of this series, Smith and I are speaking of many of the same textual materials. But, this does not mean that we are in total agreement. For example, Smith does not consider to be real a problem with Freud's theory that I raised in the second article of this series: Freud considered conscious thoughts meaningful, his theory requires their meaning be transferred to them from unconscious thoughts, which transpire, outside the perception—consciousness system, but the theory does not make this transfer possible.