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This essay introduces a series of reflections on the mind–body relation as articulated within the context of psychoanalytic theory and practice. An inclusive theory of psychoanalysis must include the body as an integral object of study and treatment, and further, efforts to formulate a theory of self encompassing the complete human person must include the body as integral part of the person. The body self, assuming brain as a core component of body, is synonymous with the person so that understanding the self requires a clear understanding of the mind—body relation. The present essay explores some of the dimensions of this problem within psychoanalysis and discusses the options for resolving and understanding the mind–body relation. Monistic and dualistic solutions are discussed and found wanting as foundational concepts for analysis. The conclusion is suggested that analysis will be best served by a concept of mental operations, whether conscious or unconscious, as brain actions that have independent intelligibility and meaning in their own right as objects of analytic study, even though dependent on brain action as source. Such a theory of mind–body avoids the inherent problems of both dualistic and monistic views, and seeks a middle ground of differentiated mind–body unity.