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Kindler and Shapiro undertake the complex task of commenting on two quite differently framed papers. Moreover, the authors hold distinct theoretical perspectives. Kindler looks at both papers in the light of a personal journey from orthopedic surgeon to analyst informed by self psychology. He reflects on the way both papers pose challenges to a version of himself that he once sought to maintain. For Kindler the issues raised in each paper suggest that we are in “a new era of psychoanalytic practice.” Shapiro considers each paper from the vantage point of gender issues and the use of a two-person psychology. Although her discussion raises salient theoretical and clinical issues, Shapiro's commentary does not address the thesis of my paper. Rather, she focuses almost exclusively on the clinical vignette illustrating my position.
Shapiro suggests that I am hiding my preconceptions about gender behind theory. In my view, I am arguing that theory organizes listening and understanding relevant to gender. Shapiro proposes that, in common with Hirsch, I hold an essentialist, dichotomous, stereotypical, commonsense, and conformist view of gender. Preconceptions about gender do, of course, pervade analysts' personal and theoretical perspectives. I concur with Shapiro's emphasis on the need for a critical examination of conscious, as well as unconscious, psychological and cultural “belief systems” about gender. Shapiro's conceptual agenda skews her understanding of my clinical material. She notes that my finding of Mr. X's cross-gender transference (seeing me in the paternal transference) goes counter to a traditional view of equating gender with anatomy. Yet Shapiro sets aside this contradiction with a multilayered argument. She first asserts that I am defending against intimacy and gender fluidity, establishing these as her key principles. Then shifting ground, Shapiro points to the influence of my countertransferential resistance against “seeing myself as the