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I would like to begin by thanking the authors who have graciously taken the time to write the foregoing commentaries. Because Newman's commentary is primarily supportive of points I made in the paper regarding Mitchell's relational conflict model, it did not seem to require a separate reply.
What is striking about my reaction to Tansey and Burke's critique of my paper is that I agree with much of what they say about the clinical process, but disagree almost entirely with their characterization of my account of the same process. For example, I agree that in practice there is never a “sharp dichotomy” between (to use my language) Type I and Type II transferences or projective identifications, but I disagree that I argue (even implicitly) for such a dichotomy or that it is required by the integrated model I advocate in the paper. I tried to convey the opposite, that both dimensions of the transference are always present, and even offered the idea that the relatively enduring compromise between these two transference tendencies and the defenses associated with them, constitutes what we otherwise refer to as character structure. I reemphasized the same point when I said that even in the midst of Type I reenactments, Type II transferences and projective identifications are operating in some form; and I did so again toward the end of the paper when I argued that Type I and Type II transferences often undergo simultaneous regression as treatment deepens.
I appreciate Tansey and Burke's point that the two “presentations of self” of the patient whom I briefly describe early in the paper each may contain Type I and Type II elements. But I view this as a more fine-grained application of the very kind of analysis I am advocating. I think