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The greatest divergence among us appears to be in our use of the concept selfobject clinically and theoretically. The concept of transference is used in different ways by the contributors, and this may explain the difference in the conceptualization of how unconscious aspects of past experiences enter the treatment process.
In relation to the concept of the selfobject, since we have moved beyond drive theory (as we all say we have), the “object”—which was always a “drive-object” (invested with libido and aggression)—also has to be left behind. The concept has too much theoretical baggage attached to it. We need a different conceptual term for the “other” in self psychology. Initially, the archaic selfobject1 (with its key function of providing structure building experiences) was heuristically felicitous with all of its varied implications—a usefully elastic term. It was also helpful to contrast the archaic selfobject with the object of traditional analysis, but this is a historical artifact. Kohut (1977, 1980) later corrected this when he contrasted the archaic selfobject with the mature selfobject. He retained the concept of the object clinically (when the experience was of a sexual or aggressive nature) but without having a chance later on for an adequate theoretical elaboration (Kohut, 1984).
We believe this question comes up repeatedly because—as Bacal indicated—many in the field retain the idea of a continuum from merger to distinctness and separateness and link selfobject experiences to degrees of separateness. Although the sense of separateness, in a