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PD 9(5):621-631 (1999)

Why the Search for Causality Will Not Go Away: Reply to Commentaries

Author: Mauricio Cortina MD

Some Philosophical and Conceptual Issues

I Am Very Thankful To Silverman, Strenger, And Spezzano For Their valuable comments and probing questions. I will start with a summary of the issues they have raised:

Doris Silverman and I share a vision of psychoanalysis in which hermeneutic understanding and empirical research are seen as complementary approaches to the creation of knowledge. The issues Silverman raises are elaborations and correations of that vision.
Carlo Strenger and Charles Spezzano raise several overlapping questions regarding to the place of attachment theory in contemporary psychoanalysis. What makes attachment theory specifically relevant for psychoanalysis? Will attachment become the new paradigm in psychoanalysis? Strenger has his doubts (so do I, but for different reasons, as I discuss later). Strenger and Spezzano ask whether attachment research has made some Kleinian or Freudian developmental theories obsolete. Spezzano asks a related question: Is it necessary to integrate knowledge from other disciplines (e.g., evolutionary theory, developmental theory, the neurosciences, anthropology) before we can have confidence in the psychoanalytic exploration of unconsious fantasy and conflict?
Strenger also questions whether genetic or temperamental factors may account for some of the findings of attachment research. Strenger suggests that competing evolutionary paradigms may become equally
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or more compelling than attachment theory to explain issues such as self-esteem.
Strenger questions whether the findings from attachment research demonstrate that etiological models of psychopathology (based on causal models) are necessary for constructing better narratives or reaching better therapeutic outcomes. How do we explain that many analysts using very different theories seem to have equally good results? Am I, asks Spezzano, bothered that we do not have any evidence to the contrary?

Silverman's scholarly discussion of hermeneutic and postmodern philosophy is a

PD 9(5):621-631 (1999)

Why the Search for Causality Will Not Go Away: Reply to Commentaries

Author: Mauricio Cortina MD

Some Philosophical and Conceptual Issues

I Am Very Thankful To Silverman, Strenger, And Spezzano For Their valuable comments and probing questions. I will start with a summary of the issues they have raised:

Doris Silverman and I share a vision of psychoanalysis in which hermeneutic understanding and empirical research are seen as complementary approaches to the creation of knowledge. The issues Silverman raises are elaborations and correations of that vision.
Carlo Strenger and Charles Spezzano raise several overlapping questions regarding to the place of attachment theory in contemporary psychoanalysis. What makes attachment theory specifically relevant for psychoanalysis? Will attachment become the new paradigm in psychoanalysis? Strenger has his doubts (so do I, but for different reasons, as I discuss later). Strenger and Spezzano ask whether attachment research has made some Kleinian or Freudian developmental theories obsolete. Spezzano asks a related question: Is it necessary to integrate knowledge from other disciplines (e.g., evolutionary theory, developmental theory, the neurosciences, anthropology) before we can have confidence in the psychoanalytic exploration of unconsious fantasy and conflict?
Strenger also questions whether genetic or temperamental factors may account for some of the findings of attachment research. Strenger suggests that competing evolutionary paradigms may become equally
Page 621
or more compelling than attachment theory to explain issues such as self-esteem.
Strenger questions whether the findings from attachment research demonstrate that etiological models of psychopathology (based on causal models) are necessary for constructing better narratives or reaching better therapeutic outcomes. How do we explain that many analysts using very different theories seem to have equally good results? Am I, asks Spezzano, bothered that we do not have any evidence to the contrary?

Silverman's scholarly discussion of hermeneutic and postmodern philosophy is a