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For each psychoanalytic model, the motivation posited is fundamental and has a rippling effet throughout the theory and clinical application. Jung's theory is no different. What is different is that Jung was the first to posit a fundamental striving toward realizing the potentialities of the person, what Jung called self-realization and the process of individuation. Although conscious intentions exist, Jung posited that there is an unconscious center of the psyche, called the Self, that regulates and organizes “processes of maturation” (Jacoby). Although Young-Eisendrath refers to these psychological functions as the archetype of the self (not Self), and Sedgwick tends to be more concerned with the sense of self, all of our post-Jungians retain Jung's motivational model and the correspondent notion of unconscious self-regulatory and self-directing or maturational functions. Within psychoanalysis, this self-realization motivational model and view of the self, including self-regulatory functions, most closely correspond with the work of Winnicott and Kohut, and, not surprisingly, they are the two authors the post-Jungians refer to most.
Addressing Jung's major contributions, the post-Jungians listed the concept of Self and the corresponding motivational model; the primacy of affect; the bipersonal, mutual influence field created by analyst and analysand; the concept of archetypes; the required deep involvement of the analyst in the treatment; the analyst's sharing of his or her emotional reactions; the importance of the transference and countertransference; a life-span model; a theory of complexes; and the importance of dreams as a more direct expression of the analysand's psychological situation. It is my view that Jung is not known by psychoanalysts for many of these contributions. What is striking is how fitting many of these ideas are to a contemporary relational view of the analytic relationship. Indeed, Young-Eisendrath argues that “analytical psychology is conso