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Standing in the spaces: essays on clinical process, trauma, and dissociation by Philip M. Bromberg. (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1998, 328 pp.)
Janet (1889) viewed memory as the central organizing apparatus of the mind. His work with hysterics led him to think that memory pursues two different paths: It can function automatically, in a way that is shared by human beings and other animals, and it can function in a narrative way, integrating new experiences into existing mental schema. In the normal case, these two forms of memory cooperate so that we do not see them as separate tracks. But, because the possibility of narrative memory depends on the condition of the person at the time of the experience, and on the nature of the experience itself, trauma can make the tracks diverge. Although familiar experiences are automatically assimilated without much conscious attention, frightening or very novel ones may not become part of an integrating narrative at all. They are remembered in a way that is dissociated from conscious awareness.
As we know, Freud's early work was directly influenced by Janet. In “Studies on Hysteria,” Breuer and Freud (1893–1895) wrote that hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences, by which they meant traumatic, nonnarrative memories. Breuer's theoretical chapter in this