In this commentary on Arnold Rothstein's “Compromise Formation Theory: An Intersubjective Dimension,” I address some of the limitations of compromise formation theory in addressing issues of intersubjectivity. Namely, compromise formation theory does not address intersubjectivity as a principal motivation; it takes up mutual regulation but not mutual recognition or other aspects of intersubjectivity; it does not place the intersubjective matrix at the center of clinical psychoanalytic understanding; and it does not sufficiently examine clinical concerns regarding the patient's conflicts regarding intersubjective contact with the analyst. I then discuss Rothstein's clinical vignette in an effort to provide an alternative understanding of the therapeutic action of Rothstein's clinical interventions. Drawing on the work of the late Lloyd Silverman, I present an intersubjective explanation that highlights the analyst's compassionate understanding of the patient's conflicts and acceptance of the pleasure in the patient's impulses, achieved through the analyst's own personal and subjective struggles.