The author develops three distinct senses of “dignity” that materialize in Drozek’s paper. Dignity as intrinsic worth invites the question of whether the implicit notion of dignity in contemporary psychoanalysis is best viewed as Kantian and, if so, how we are to accommodate the rationalism that inheres in it. Dignity as a state of mind leads the author to sketch the view that dignity is imperiled by absence (of vitality, of realness), contrasting it with Drozek’s emphasis on badness. Dignity as a relational provision summons inquiry into the distinction between “valuing” and “recognizing” in the encounter between subjectivities. Recognition, it is suggested, not only begets love, but also serves as the most compelling analytic instantiation of the Kantian Formula for Humanity—to treat the other as an end. By spelling out these interrelated significations, we not only discern our debts to the concept of dignity but also reveal potential psychoanalytic contributions to the broader conversation about dignity’s essence.