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Awareness, according to this model, comes into being in the latter part of the first year—long before children can pass the test of recognizing their own face in a mirror after a rouge spot has been surreptitiously placed on their nose (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This should not be terribly surprising, because in general the appearance of a function in a naturalistic, self-occurring way is likely to precede the possibility of experimental elicitation of the function in what is often an unnatural setting. The naturalistic situation, on the other hand, suffers in comparison by being more ambiguous. Both situations share the common problem of having to resort to somewhat arbitrary definitions and cutting points regarding what will and will not be admitted as qualifying within a particular concept.
Awareness comes into being when the ubiquitous monitoring functions have advanced or have been raised to a higher level of organization. It is not an all-or-nothing event. It can vary in its sharpness, in its pervasiveness, and in its own level of organization. It can vary within an individual from moment to moment. It can vary among individuals, some being more aware or differently aware than others. And it certainly changes developmentally. The 1-year-old may be aware and the adult may be aware. Although the same word is used and certain properties may exist in common, the processes in the two individuals are certainly not synonymous.