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All our contributors approach the subject of the structural theory that evolved from the writings of Rapaport (1951), Hartmann (1950, 1953), and Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein (1949) with a degree of restlessness. Some contributors believe that the structural and tripartite theories should be substantially modified because they lack explanatory power for the analytic process. They believe theories based upon systems or schemata processing is better suited to explain the analytic situation. Others believe that the structural theory should remain intact, although greater clarity is required in conceptualizing the hierarchy of theoretical abstraction and the application of the metapsychological principles. Still others believe that the structural theory should be discarded and replaced by a theory emphasizing an experience or a phenomenological viewpoint. Finally, one contributor emphasizes that theory must include a model of the model-maker.
Several questions are raised and left unanswered. Should the structural theory remain the principal theory of psychoanalysis or should it be one of several theories because no theory is adequate to encompass all psychological functions? Although it is argreed that psychic conflict is fundamental to mental life, are the boundaries between id, ego, and superego the principal localities for conflict? Furthermore, is a closed causal system of natural science or a phenomenological system of humanities best suited to conceptualized psychic phenomena?
Although the contributors share the same methodology in acquiring empirical data through the psychoanalytic method, we are left with a variety of views and questions when they use their data in psychoanalytic theorizing. With regard to the two facets of the subject, the presentation of new models and critiques or defenses