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Ever since Descartes wrote about it in the 17th century, many Western philosophers have been interested in the nature of the human capacity to reflect. Although much of that interest has been motivated by a search for the epistemological foundations of science, some of it has been directed toward discovering the nature of the person who reflects (see Kierkegaard, 1849; Dennett, 1976; Taylor, 1976). The latter concern is central to the present paper. Most philosophers have taken a nondevelopmental approach, from the stance of the rational adult thinker, even when they are concerned about continuity of the person through time.
In the present paper I discuss two important philosophical theories of human reflection, those of Descartes and Hume. I am suggesting that although David Hume rejected some of Descartes's assumptions, he retained some important and very problematic Cartesian claims about the nature of mind, body, and reflection. These assumptions form the core of the dominant philosophical theory of reflection. I then sketch what I consider a more satisfactory account of reflection. Each of these theories may be seen as having possible implications for therapy.