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The papers in this first section use Fred Pine's recent work to address the problem of “the clinical use of multiple models.” Pine has developed a clinical strategy that consists of a synthesis of four psychoanalytic models which he defines under the rubric: psychologies of drive, ego, object relations, and self experience. Let me begin my synopsis with some comments about Pine's approach to models.
Psychoanalysis uses the concept of models flexibly within the clinical and metapsychological levels of theory. It may refer to something as specific as the structural model, or, as in the case of Pine's “psychologies,” to something as general as a point of view about the way the mind works. In general and especially for Pine, models represent those ideas that determine both what we consider as data and how we organize and understand those data.
Within psychoanalysis, competing models claim privileged positions by dint of some primary phenomena to which other phenomena can be traced. However, for Pine, the problem is that all of the models offer equally reasonable arguments for why they deserve privilege. Thus, the problem of primacy is seen as “unproductive.”
Pine sees the theoretical points of view that have emerged in psychoanalysis—drive, ego, object relations and self—as not only products of the culture, historical circumstances, and personalities