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Although the concept of countertransference is a cornerstone of clinical psychoanalysis, one that is fundamental to the theory of analytic technique, the boundaries of its definition have remained open to debate. The analytic literature contains numerous efforts by various authors to widen or narrow the scope of the meaning of countertransference or to promote or discourage its relevance for clinical technique. So many contrasting views have been voiced that the term countertransference has come to suffer from overexpansion, attempts at overt and covert redefinition, a lack of precision, and an inconstancy of usage.
In considering the literature on countertransference, which is too extensive to summarize here (see, for example, Tyson, 1986, and Slakter, 1987), it becomes apparent that the use of the term by any given author will be determined by his/her stance in regard to four fundamental questions:
To what extent are the feelings, fantasies, and responses of the analyst in the analytic situation a function of the psychology of the analyst (e.g., Freud, 1910; Reich, 1951) or the patient (Heimann (1950)?
Should the term countertransference refer to a broad or narrow range of feelings and reactions in the analyst to the patient and the analytic situation?
Dr. Levine is Faculty, Boston Psychoanalytic Institute (BPSI); Faculty, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis (MIP).
Can countertransference be a help as well as a hindrance to the analyst in the conduct of an analysis?
If there are potentially positive technical uses for the analyst's experience of countertransference, how are they to be conceptualized? (This last point touches upon whether or when to reveal one's experience to the patient.)
The uncertainty that surrounds the definition and connotations of the term countertransference is reflected in The Use of the Self (Jacobs, 1991). There are many places where Jacobs uses the term in its “narrow” sense (Kernberg, 1965) to refer to forces and conflicts wit