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THEORETICAL EMPHASES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS HAVE CHANGED over the years from classical drive theory to an increasing focus on the role of object relationships and object representation in personality development and psychopathology (e.g., Winnicott, 1960; Blatt, 1974; Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975; Kernberg, 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1983a). Central to object relational models is the concept of mental representation of self and other. Mental representations are enduring cognitive-affective psychological structures that provide templates for processing and organizing information so that new experiences are assimilated to existing metal structures. These mental schemas guide an individual's behavior, particularly in interpersonal relationships (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b). These cognitive-affective schemas or mental representations of self and other develop over the life cycle. They have conscious and unconscious cognitive, affective, and experiential components that derive from significant early interpersonal experiences. These cognitive-affective schemas can involve veridical representations of consensual reality, idiosyncratic and unique constructions, or primitive and pathological distortions that suggest