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Human Motivation has been a Central Feature of psychoanalysis from its inception. Hidden motivation is what intrigued the founders of psychoanalysis. Breuer and Freud sought to discover the cause of mysterious symptoms and developed important explanations that hinged on unconscious motivation. When Freud abandoned the trauma theory of the neurosis, he put drive motivation at the center of psychoanalytic thought, which continues for many to this day. Over the years there have been many other theorists who have altered Freud's dual drive theory in various directions, including putting emphasis on object seeking rather than drive seeking, on expanding fundamental motivations well beyond the dual drives, and in addition, reviving the centrality of trauma in the formation of psychopathology.
This issue is dedicated to a contemporary view of the state of human motivation in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.
Gail Reed, in her paper, “Patients' Motivations and the Analyst's Experience,” illustrates her understanding of motivation in psychoanalysis by presenting three detailed clinical vignettes chosen from her practice preceding the weekend in which she undertook to write her essay. In presenting her work this way, she highlights her approach to theory, that clinical experience precedes and takes precedence over theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, she is forthright in presenting these theoretical assumptions at the end of each of the vignettes. She assumes that free associations are verbal derivatives of drives and that the interplay of drive derivatives and defenses are the main constituents of conflict. She finds concepts of regression, projective identification, and the illusion of omnipotent control to be important and manifest in transference and countertransference.
James Grotstein, in his paper, “Some Reflections on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation: Toward a Theory of Entelechy,” addresses an important Cartesian bias in the concept of projective