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The vast agreement and synthesis of psychoanalytic thought about and on the use of metaphor expressed in this issue indicate paths open for further exploration. Most important, a clear consensus on the conceptual model of unconscious metaphor is formulated from a broad interdisciplinary base, one that is compatible with a functionally unified view of memory and inherently communicable emotion from modern neuroscience. Because this model both fits the observations of the psychoanalytic situation and conforms to biological knowledge, it represents a potentially incremental contribution to metapsychological theorizing that, eventually, may yield a better understanding of why particular analytic principles and techniques are valid and effective. Thus, the notion of an unconscious metaphoric process may be productive in elucidating many areas of psychoanalytic theory and practice (e.g., Barnett, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Katz, in press/in preparation), proving this concept robust in progressive research. In this connection—and given the crucial importance of the ability of the analyst to discern, process, and play with metaphor as an essential aspect of treatment—it may be that consideration toward integrating this model into analytic training is called for in the near future, entailing curricular development at a basic level.
Our twin issues of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, “Exploring Emotional Memory—Psychoanalytic Perspectives” and “Metaphoric Processes in Psychoanalytic Treatment,” have pursued the basic psychoanalytic principle that what is of significance, value, or meaning for individuals, especially in relation to others, ultimately may be traced to memory—the memory of feelings. If our emotions, feelings, and their associated defensive patterns are also the original sources of metaphor as a way of understanding ourselves, others, and the objective world, then in accordance with Arnold Modell's eloquent epistemic argument in Imagination and the Meaningful Brain,