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Metaphors are “in terms of” relationships whereas metonymies are “stands for” or “belongs to” relationships. These relationships are basic on the linguistic, mental, and developmental level. They are therefore suitable for a psychoanalytic framework language capable of uniting the psychoanalytic schools and achieving a rapprochement to those cognitive sciences which already see the mind's functioning as based on metaphor and metonymy. Psychoanalysis with its dialectic between past, present, and future yields a temporal dimension to metaphor: Mentation at one time is understood in terms of mentation at another time—therefore metaphorically (“in terms of”). If metaphoric “in terms of” flexibility is lost, a metonymic (neurotic) “stands for” or “belongs to” relationship holds between issues rooted in different times. It is this temporal dimension of metaphor and metonymy which can conceptually bridge the cognitive sciences with psychoanalysis. The main psychodynamic concepts transference, interpretation, and defense, if slightly reformulated, become relevant within and without the treatment setting. They all can be seen as relating issues from different times flexibly (metaphorically) or neurotically (metonymically) with each other. This leads to conceptualizing transference, interpretation, and defense as having two variants: A metaphoric (healthy) and metonymic (neurotic) one. Psychoanalytic theory was burdened by a one-sided focus on clarification at the expense of enigmatization, both being important aspects of metaphor. The enigmatization, not understood in its theoretical centrality, was therefore collectively enacted as a Babel-like confusion between psychoanalytic languages. The central importance of metaphor and metonymy was not theorized.